WTO 상소기구 운영 평가: 상소 위원 구성을 중점으로 by 이하경
 
 
저 시-비 리- 경 지 2.0 한민  
는 아래  조건  르는 경 에 한하여 게 
l  저 물  복제, 포, 전송, 전시, 공연  송할 수 습니다.  
다 과 같  조건  라야 합니다: 
l 하는,  저 물  나 포  경 ,  저 물에 적 된 허락조건
 명확하게 나타내어야 합니다.  
l 저 터  허가를 면 러한 조건들  적 되지 않습니다.  
저 에 른  리는  내 에 하여 향  지 않습니다. 
것  허락규약(Legal Code)  해하  쉽게 약한 것 니다.  
Disclaimer  
  
  
저 시. 하는 원저 를 시하여야 합니다. 
비 리. 하는  저 물  리 목적  할 수 없습니다. 
경 지. 하는  저 물  개 , 형 또는 가공할 수 없습니다. 
 
 
국제학석사학위논문  
 
Examining the Operation of the WTO 
Appellate Body: Focusing on the 
Composition 
 
WTO 상소기구 운영 평가: 상소 위원 구성을 
중점으로 
 
2018년 2월 
서울대학교 국제대학원 
국제학과 국제협력전공 
이하경  
 
 
i 
 
Abstract 
 
Examining the Operation of the WTO Appellate Body 
: Focusing on the Composition  
 
Ha-gyung Yi 
International Cooperation Major 
The Graduate School of International Studies 
Seoul National University 
 
 After the establishment in 1995, more than 500 cases were brought 
to the WTO Appellate Body. The significance of the organization 
necessitates a test for its operation. Operation of an organization can be 
tested by various factors. Among those, this paper focus on impartiality and 
professionalism by looking at the composition of the AB. The impartiality 
here refers to the independence from the members—governments—of the 
WTO. The AB sustains those values by articles in the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and 
Working Procedures for the AB.  
ii 
 First, upon selecting the sitting Appellate Body Members, they 
demand broad representation of the Membership of the WTO. Second, the 
AB is distinct from the dispute settlement in the panel level in that it does 
not ban a national of the case from serving the case. The paper tested 
whether such a freedom cause home state advantage. Lastly, the DSB 
requires the Appellate Body Members to show expertise in the issues dealt 
in the organization. This paper analyzed whether the history of the AB 
composition reflected such three requirements mentioned in the DSB and 
the Working Procedures.  
 After the analysis, it is found that the AB bears some problems. The 
composition does not represent the Membership of the WTO broadly and 
shows domination of some countries. The home state advantage does not 
distinctively appear and the impartiality seems to be sustained in the AB, yet 
leaving a room for anxiety due to high proportion of Members serving cases 
that involve home states. Next, only three out of twenty-seven Members 
showed expertise in trade remedy which occupies almost half of the cases 
brought to the AB. 
  
Keywords: WTO Appellate Body, WTO Appellate Body composition, Appellate 
Body Members, DSU, Expertise of AB Members, home-state advantage 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background and Purpose of the Study 
 
Existence of an international court is justified with its legitimacy. 
One of earlier literatures asserts that for an international court, “no attribute 
is more important than legitimacy [since it] provides courts authority.”1 
And the legitimacy comes from the international court’s independence, 
impartiality, and expertise on pertinent legal matter. Here, the judicial 
independence refers to “the freedom of judges to decide disputes upon the 
facts and the law, free of outside influences such as the preferences of 
powerful states”2 
Dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization, 
especially the Appellate Body is substantially functioning as the world’s 
trade court although it has never been officially nominated as a court since 
                                                 
1 Gibson, G. L., & Caldeira, G. A. (1995). The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal 
Institutions: Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice. American Journal of 
Political Science, 39(2), 459-489, p. 460 
2 Dunoff, J. L., & Pollack, M. A. (2017). The Judicial Trilemma. American Journal of 
International Law, Forthcoming; Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2017-05. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955172, p. 1 
2 
its service in 1995. However, over 500 disputes brought to the system and 
350 rulings issued support that states perceive the dispute settlement system 
as the troubleshooter for trade disputes.3 
The creation of the Appellate Body was the major development that 
distinguished the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism from that of former 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947 system.4 As a result, 
the WTO Dispute Settlement system could settle itself as a quasi-world 
trade court with the establishment of the standing Appellate Body.  
The establishment of standing Appellate Body introduced legalism 
and binding authority to the dispute settlement system, and this explains 
why the its establishment is often called as a ‘jewel of crown’. The 
Appellate Body comprises seven persons who hear appeals, make decision, 
and write Appellate Body Report. While none of the UN documents refer 
Appellate Body as court or Appellate Body Members as judge, it certainly 
functions as a quasi-international court for trade issues seeing that it may 
uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions made in the 
panel level. In addition, as any other judgments made by international courts, 
the Appellate Body Report shall be unconditionally accepted by the parties 
                                                 
3 www.wto.org 
4 In fact, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is a stretch initiated in 1995 from that 
under the GATT. 
3 
to the dispute within 30 days following its circulation to the members 
according to the DSU Article 17.14.5 Therefore, seven Members play main 
role in operating the Appellate Body because they are the subject who 
produce such a ruling.  
With such authority and compulsory implementation of the result, 
who sits in the Appellate Body is definitely an important issue. Since the 
WTO dispute settlement system deals with multi-billion dollar impact trade 
issues brought by states, those seats should be occupied by reliable and 
qualified persons who pursue common interest for world trade; who are 
capable of resolving trade-related legal issues with expertise; and who can 
make impartial decisions. Hence, the evaluation on operation of the 
Appellate Body, in part, lies on composition of the Appellate Body. From 
this angle, this thesis focuses on history of AB composition and thereby 
evaluates its operation. In evaluating the operation of the organization, 
independence, impartiality and expertise of the composition will be tested 
owing to the fact that they are important values that sustain the legitimacy of 
a court.  
                                                 
5 According to Shaffer, G., Elsig, M., & Puig, S. (2016), “WTO members have been careful 
not to refer to the Appellate Body as a court or to its members as judges. Rather, the DSU 
refers to Appellate Body members as “persons” who comprise “the Appellate Body 
membership” and who have “demonstrated expertise in law” (Article 17). The Appellate 
Body members refer to themselves as “members,” and not as judges.” 
4 
Rüdiger Wolfrum divided types of a court’s legitimacy into three: 
source-oriented factor, process-oriented factor, and result-oriented factor.6 
First, an international court can justify its authority with the source that is 
given to the organization at the point of establishment, such as consent to be 
bound. Process-oriented legitimacy lies in “fair and even-handed procedures 
and the open-mindedness of judges”, while the result-oriented legitimacy 
relies on the evaluation by the constituents on “how well the international 
court performs its functions.”7 
Among the legitimacy listed above, legitimacy in this thesis 
indicates the second type, the process-oriented legitimacy. Impartiality and 
professionalism of the Appellate Body will be tested by thorough analysis 
on the composition of the AB Members since the AB sustains those values 
by devices set in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) and Working Procedures for the AB. If 
deficiency in impartiality and expertise is detected in the composition of the 
AB, such procedural legitimacy is being hurt and it would signify that AB is 
not being operated well. 
 In fact, voices of concerns regarding before-mentioned two values 
                                                 
6 Röben, V., & Wolfrum, R. (2008). Legitimacy in international law. Berlin: Springer, p. 6. 
7 Ibid. 
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in the Appellate Body have been heard since the establishment.  
 In case of the impartiality, the influence of certain Members on the 
operation of the Appellate Body has been causing anxiety. Steinberg 
criticized the DSM in similar context. According to his argument, judicial 
decision-making in the WTO faces ‘a hard political constraint’ in its action 
due to some powerful Members such as the United States and EU. These 
actors are capable of influencing the rulings of the Appellate Body in their 
interest. At the DSM, which is the focus of this thesis, more powerful actors 
influence the DSM to their own advantage if you see the record of quasi-
judicial lawmaking by the Appellate Body.8 
Another critical perspective was proposed by Garrett and McCall-
Smith. They have found out that the Appellate Body conciliates to more 
powerful Member States. Therefore, in the short term, Appellate Body 
decisions become strategic and often political.9 The AB’s reluctance to 
strong and unequivocal adverse rulings against powerful WTO members on 
sensitive trade issues that could impact the domestic politics supports their 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Garret, G. & Smith, J. M. (1999). The Politics of the WTO Dispute Settlement, Paper 
prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Atlanta, GA, September 1-5, 1999, 1-47, p. 44. Retrieved December 22, 2017, 
from 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.35.408&rep=rep1&type=pdf  
6 
argument.10 
The influence of the US on appointment of the AB Member is also 
the source where the voices of concern regarding the legitimacy of the 
organization are rising. The US blocked the reappointment of Chang Seung-
wha, the former AB Member, identifying four cases where he overstepped 
the authority of the AB. The US representative argued that his actions 
“raised systemic concerns about the disregard for the proper role of the 
Appellate Body and the WTO dispute settlement system.” 11  The 
international community was alarmed by the US announcement. South 
Korean delegation denounced the US by stating that "its [US] message is 
loud and clear: If AB Members make decisions that do not conform to US 
perspectives, they are not going to be reappointed."12 The former and 
current Appellate Body Members sent a letter to the DSB and expressed a 
strong warning that such an action would jeopardize the credibility of the 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Statement by the United States at the Meeting of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
Geneva May 23, 2016. 
12 Elsig, M., & Shaffer, G. (2016, June 6). The U.S is causing a major controversy in the 
World Trade Organization. Here's what's happening. The Washington Post. Retrieved 
December 20, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/06/06/the-u-s-is-trying-to-block-the-reappointment-of-a-wto-judge-here-are-
3-things-to-know/?utm_term=.17b98ea26882 
7 
WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.13 With the incident threatening the 
organization’s independence, the legitimacy of the Appellate Body were 
injured. 
 Besides, controversies with respect to the quality of Appellate Body 
Members have been rising as well. The critics’ point is that the AB recently 
appointed AB Members who lack legal experience or language proficiency 
in WTO official language that is necessary for writing a legal document.14 
 In this sense, the operation of the Appellate Body is worth 
examining in order to add substantial evidence to the criticism. 
 
1.2. Structure and Methodology 
 
The criteria to evaluate the legitimacy of the WTO Appellate Body 
are drawn out from the articles in the DSU and Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review. They will be elaborated in the second chapter.  
From the third chapter through the fifth chapter, the legitimacy of 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Appleton, A. E. (2016). Judging the Judges or Judging the Members?: Pathways and 
Pitfalls in the Appellate Body Appointment Process. Judging the State in International 
Trade and Investment Law: Sovereignty Modern, the Law and the Economics, 11–31, p. 12 
8 
the WTO will be assessed according to three criteria previously mentioned. 
In the same section, significance of each criteria will be explained in the 
beginning and literatures will be reviewed to speculate how earlier studies 
studied broad representation, nationality limit, and expertise of judge of an 
international court. The analysis of the AB’s composition will follow 
according to the aforementioned criteria. The status quo of the ITLOS and 
ICJ under the same criteria will be compared with the Appellate Body at the 
end of each chapter. In the conclusion, some recommendations will be 
suggested. 
 Research methodology differs by chapters, but statistical analysis 
will be the main research methodology. In common, the correspondence of 
records of composition of the Appellate Body and the rules governing the 
AB will be tested with the reprocessed raw data from the WTO website. 
These processed data are arranged in tables and statistics and they will be 
utilized as evidence to my arguments regarding the conformity of the 
composition of the AB to the rules in the DSU and Working Procedures for 
the Appellate Body.  
 
1.3 Overview on the Appellate Body 
 
9 
 A simple explanation on the operation and composition of the 
Appellate Body will help to understand the later parts of the thesis. 
 
1.3.1 Authority and Procedure 
 
 The DSU Article 17.6 binds the AB’s jurisdiction within the issues 
of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the 
panel. 15  The AB can uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and 
conclusions that have been already concluded in the panel level.16 Hence, 
the jurisdiction of the Appellate Body is imposed with more constraints 
compared to other international courts or the panel level. In order to block 
contradiction in decisions and to ensure consistency and collegiality, the 
Members consult with the entire Appellate Body Membership before issuing 
the ruling.17 
 Once an Appellate Body releases the report, the losing parties have 
obligation to comply with the AB’s final decision within a reasonable period 
of time. The winning parties have option to request a panel review on the 
                                                 
15 DSU Article 17.6 
16 DSU Article 17.13 
17 Van Grasstek, C. (2013). The History and Future of the World Trade Organization. 
World Trade Organization, p. 240 
10 
compliance of the ruling by the losing parties according to the DSU Article 
21.5. Such a panel review can be also appealed in the AB. 
 
1.3.2 Selection of a Member 
 
 Understanding how the Appellate Body is composed will important 
in understanding the dynamics between AB Members, states, and AB. The 
DSB appoints the AB Members.18 The procedures follow the paragraph 13 
of the DSB's 1995 Decision on the Establishment of the Appellate Body. 
First the Selection Committee is established. It is composed of the WTO 
Director-General and chairpersons of the DSB, the General Council, and the 
Councils for Trade in Goods, Trade in services and TRIPS. The delegations 
then turn in the names and resumes of their candidates. Then, the Committee 
carries out interviews with the candidates who were nominated by the 
delegations. After conducting interviews with all candidates, the Committee 
puts forward a candidate or candidates to the DSB for appointment. The 
DSB makes a decision on appointment and the candidates that were sent up 
to the DSB are usually appointed.19 
                                                 
18 DSU Article 17.2 
19 Macrory, P., Appleton, A. & Plummer, M. (2007) The World Trade Organization: Legal, 
11 
 
1.3.3 Distribution of Members to the Case 
 
 The random distribution of Members to the cases is also important 
measure to secure impartialness and independence of the AB from states’ 
influence.  
 Disputes that are filed to the Appellate Body are assigned randomly. 
Article 6 of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review articulates that 
they are distributed “on the basis of rotation, while taking into account the 
principles of random selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all 
Members to serve regardless of their national origin.”20 Said El Naggar, the 
former Appellate Body Member in the first batch, devised a method that 
could actualize the random assignment. The seven Members of the 
Appellate Body will be pick a chip that has number written on it. That 
number becomes their identification. And then, the numbers will be 
assigned to cases through mathematical system. By using this method, the 
distribution of the case cannot be disclosed to Appellate Body Members in 
                                                                                                                            
Economic and Political Analysis. Geneva: Springer, p. 1287 
20 Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Article 6.2 
12 
advance.21  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Supra note 14, p. 241 
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Chapter II. Criteria for Evaluation 
 
2.1 Criteria 
 
The standards for evaluation are derived from the rules concerning 
the composition of the Appellate Body. Three rules govern composition of 
the Appellate Body: DSU, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules 
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, and Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review. Among them, this thesis will focus on 
Article 17 paragraph 3 of the DSU and Article 6 paragraph 2 of the Working 
Procedures for Appellate Review. 
 
DSU 
Article 17 
3 . The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized 
authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade 
and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally. They 
shall be unaffiliated with any government. The Appellate Body 
membership shall be broadly representative of membership in the 
14 
WTO… 
 
Working Procedure for Appellate Review 
Article 6 
2. The Members constituting a division shall be selected on the 
basis of rotation, while taking into account the principles of random 
selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all Members to serve 
regardless of their national origin. 
 
From the above-mentioned articles, I drew out three criteria for 
evaluation. Pursuant to the Article 17 paragraph 1 and 3, the Appellate body 
members shall be broadly representative of membership in the WTO; 
Members can serve the case regardless of their nationality; persons 
comprising the AB should demonstrate expertise in law, international trade 
and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally.  
Therefore, three aspects will be checked: whether the composition 
of the Appellate Body broadly represents the membership in the WTO; 
whether lift of ban on nationality undermine impartiality of the AB; whether 
the AB members have expertise in covered agreements (trade remedy). 
15 
 
2.2 Significance 
 
2.2.1 Broad Representation 
 
 The first criteria broad representation bears significance in two 
ways, one for qualified ruling that reflects legal diversity of the world and 
the other for preventing uneven playing field in the AB.  
David Unterhalter, the former AB Member, singles out legal 
diversity as the reason why the AB composition should reflect broad 
representation of the WTO Membership in his farewell speech.22 
 
“It (The composition of the Appellate Body) does not represent the 
membership, but it must reflect the diversity that makes up the 
membership. It has always been a strength of the Appellate Body that its 
Members come from very different legal traditions, and very different 
societies. These perspectives are brought to bear upon a common 
purpose: the resolution of disputes under the discipline of WTO law. 
                                                 
22 David Unterhalter is the former Appellate Body Member who served two terms from 
2006 to 2013. 
16 
The decisions of the Appellate Body yield singular answers. The 
decision-makers are diverse. The result is the richer for it.”23 
  
As the speech iterates, broad representation of an international court like the 
Appellate Body is significant since the diversity achieved through it 
enriches jurisprudence of the Appellate Body. Also, Dannenbaum (2012) 
emphasizes “both regional and legal systemic diversity [since they] provide 
international courts with genuine value”.24 He cites Professor Georges Abi-
Saab in explaining the importance of diversity25: 
  
 “Legal-systemic diversity helps to preserve “the unicity and 
 intellectual autonomy of international law, which should not be 
 identified with any single legal system or tradition.”26 
                                                 
23 Farewell Ceremony of Appellate Body Member David Unterhalter, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/unterhalterspeech_e.htm 
24 Dannenbaum, T. (2012). Nationality and the International Judge : The Nationalist 
Presumption Governing the International Judiciary and Why it Must Be Reversed. Cornell 
International Law Journal, 45(1), 77–184. p.176 
25 Georges Abi-Saab is the former Appellate Body Member who served two terms, from 
2000 to 2008. 
26 Georges Abi-Saab, Presentation: Ensuring the Best Bench— Ways of Selecting Judges, 
in Peck, C. & Lee. R. (1997). Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court of 
Justice: Proceedings of the ICJ/UNITAR Colloquium to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of 
the Court, the Peace Palace. The Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijihoff Publishers, 
17 
 
The second reason that the AB should reflect regional diversity in 
its composition is to prevent uneven playing field for some states. 
According to logic of Dannenbaum (2012), when judges with one legal 
tradition fills up an international court, some countries feels easier to access, 
while the court becomes less reachable to others. 27  In fact, the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism shows skewed utilization by some of the 
WTO members. 
 The diversity issue hence extends to impartiality and independence 
of the Appellate Body from the parties, which directly relate to the 
legitimacy of the institution. If the Appellate Body fails to represent the 
membership of the WTO and function as a gentlemen’s club by few states, 
trust will be worn away and states whose legal tradition is not reflected by 
the AB will avoid bringing the case to the WTO. 
  
2.2.2 Influence of Nationality of a Member 
 
                                                                                                                            
p. 169 
27 Supra note 20. 
18 
 Table 1 compares contradictory rules for the panel and the AB on 
nationality of a Member taking charge of the case. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Rule between Panel and the AB 
Appellate Body Panel 
Working Procedures for the 
Appellate Review, Article 6 
DSU, Article 8 
(2) The Members constituting a 
division shall be selected on the 
basis of rotation, while taking into 
account the principles of random 
selection, unpredictability and 
opportunity for all Members to 
serve regardless of their national 
origin. 
3. Citizens of Members whose 
governments are parties to the 
dispute or third parties as defined 
in paragraph 2 of Article 10 shall 
not serve on a panel concerned 
with that dispute, unless the parties 
to the dispute agree otherwise. 
 
While the panel bans a national or even a third party national from 
parties to the dispute from serving the panel, the Appellate Body rejected 
such a nationality limit and takes a cosmopolitan approach allowing 
Members to serve the cases detached from the nationality of parties to the 
dispute. 
Yet, contrary to the cosmopolitan approach taken by the AB most of 
19 
the traditional literatures consider judges as “inherently and irreversibly 
partial to, and perhaps dependent on, their respective countries of origin”.28 
The ICJ and the ITLOS also have this assumption in the basis of their 
statute.  
The WTO Appellate Body receives similar criticism. According to 
Elsig, M., & Pollack, M. A. (2014), WTO AB appointment process is 
politicized. The Member states oppose a candidate whose past experience 
indicates that he or she does not fit their preference.29 
In this sense, influence of the nationality of an AB Member to the 
result of the case is an issue that needs to be addressed. The result can either 
prove that international Judges are unavoidably preferential to their home 
states or show that there is a considerable detachment between nationality 
and a Member’s decision. 
 
2.2.3 Expertise in Trade Remedy 
  
                                                 
28 Supra note 20, p. 78 
29 Elsig, M., & Pollack, M. A. (2014). Agents, trustees, and international courts: The 
politics of judicial appointment at the World Trade Organization. European Journal of 
International Relations , 20(2), 391-415. 
20 
 The legitimacy of a court also lies in the quality and competence of 
judges. 
 According to the DSU Article 17.3, an AB Member should 
demonstrate expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of 
the covered agreements generally. Among them this thesis will focus on 
judge’s expertise on trade remedy. The reasons are high rate of trade remedy 
cases addressed in the Appellate Body and contentiousness. 
 As of November, 2017, 132 Appellate Reports have been adopted. 
Among 132 Appellate Review, 65 cases concerned trade remedy 
agreements.30 The proportion of trade remedy cases reached 49% of the 
total disputes as of November 2017, proving that trade remedy is important 
qualification for an AB Member. 
 Second reason that third part of the thesis treats trade remedy issue 
out of many other international agreements that are addressed to the AB is 
due to the contentiousness of the issue. Especially, the United States is 
continuously clashing with the AB on trade remedy issues. The US was 
repeatedly and consistently accused in violation of the anti-dumping 
agreement. Moreover, the past safeguard measures by the US has never been 
                                                 
30 There are three WTO agreements regarding trade remedy: Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM), Anti-dumping Agreement, and The Agreement on 
Safeguards. 
21 
found to be WTO-consistent as of 2014 and subsidies for products 
concerning steel, cotton, lumber and aircraft were caught to be against WTO 
subsidies agreement. Some literatures written in the US spot the AB for 
culprit of destroying US industries.31  
 In this context, the importance and necessity for a Member who has 
profound knowledge and experience in trade remedy have continuously 
grown.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 For example, “How the WTO Undermines U.S. Trade Remedy Enforcement” written by 
Stewart, P. & Drake, E. (2017). 
22 
Chapter III. The First Criteria: Broad 
Representation 
  
 In this part, the DSU article related to broad representation will be 
identified and interpreted, and with the interpretation the composition of the 
institution will be assessed. 
 
3.1 Related Rule and Interpretation 
The Article 17.3 of the DSU requires rather vague standard for the 
composition of the Appellate Body. 
 
 DSU 17.3 
The Appellate Body membership shall be broadly representative 
of membership in the WTO. 
  
 Here, the interpretation of the ‘broadly represent’ is crucial in order 
to evaluate whether the AB composition reflects the entire membership of 
23 
the WTO. Yet, the DSU provides no further explanation or criteria that is 
necessary to interpret ‘broadly representative of the WTO membership’. 
Hence the scope of broad remains quite ambiguous. Young and Cullen 
(2010) faced the same problem of interpreting ‘broadly representative’ from 
the Basic Law of Hong Kong. They interpreted ‘broad’ as less than ‘exactly’ 
and ‘absolutely’. 32  The dictionary defines broadly as ‘in general and 
without considering minor details.’33 
Taking earlier study and definition into account I have set two 
minimum standards for broad representation. 1) No region must be excluded 
from the Appellate Body Member composition34 2) In the region, certain 
countries should not dominate the position in the AB. 
The unit of analysis in this study is region in testing ‘broad’. This is 
because the simplest way to check broad distribution of the seat to the 
worldwide membership is to see whether the regions are evenly represented. 
The WTO classifies the member states into seven geographical regions: 
North America, South/Central America, Europe, Commonwealth of 
                                                 
32 Young, S. N. M., & Cullen, R. (2010). Electing Hong Kong’s Chief Executive. Hong 
Kong University Press. p. 52 
33 Broadly. (2017). In Oxford. Retrieved from 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/broadly 
34 WTO divides the world into seven regions: North America, South/Central America, 
Europe, Commonwealth of Independent States, Africa, Middle East, and Asia 
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Independent States, Africa, Middle East, and Asia. 
 
3.2 Two Trends regarding Representation in the Appellate Body 
 
When broad representation of the Appellate Body Members for past 
22 years were analyzed with the criteria laid out above, two trends were 
visible. Commonwealth of Independent States and Middle East never had a 
seat in the Appellate Body; and certain countries repeatedly represented the 
region. 
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3.2.1. The First Trend: Exclusion of CIS and Middle East 
 
Figure 1. Countries that are parties to the WTO35 
 
Figure 2. Countries that have produced an Appellate Body Member 
 
                                                 
35 Retrieved from https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/org6_map_e.htm, 
20171110 
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Thus far, the WTO holds 164 Countries as the Member states. Their 
regional composition is laid out in the Figure 3.  
 
 Figure 3. WTO Membership categorized by regions 
 
The DSB fixated five regions among seven as the producer of 
Appellate Body members. For the past 22 years, Appellate Body Members’ 
nationality belonged to North America, Central and South America, Asia 
(especially from South/West Asia, East Asia, and Oceania), Europe, and 
Africa. 36  The figure 2 visualizes the nationalities of Appellate Body 
                                                 
36 According to the WTO website, “the European Union (until 30 November 2009 
known officially in the WTO as the European Communities for legal reasons) has been a 
WTO member since 1 January 1995. The 28 member States of the EU are also WTO 
members in their own right. The EU is a single customs union with a single trade policy 
and tariff. The European Commission — the EU’s executive arm — speaks for all EU 
member States at almost all WTO meetings.” Therefore, EU is considered as one unit in 
this paper. 
Regions Number
Africa 49
Asia 30
Middle East 8
CIS 6
Central and South America 30
North America 2
Europe 39
SUM 164
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Members. Although the WTO holds 164 member states world-wide as 
shown in the Figure 1, only a part of the continents are colored in the Figure 
2 while others remain white. Among them, there are certain regions 
explicitly remain uncolored: Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
and the Middle East. The exclusion of these regions threatens the Appellate 
Body’s broad representation of the WTO membership. 
The continuous appointment of persons from five regions leaves 
room for questions. What is the standard of selecting these five regions 
among seven regions? Does the exclusion of the CIS and the Middle East 
result from lack of membership, small trade volume, or passive participation? 
First, the CIS and Middle East show high rate of WTO membership 
as any other continents. Among CIS states, Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Kyrgyz Republic are the 
members of the WTO. Azerbaijan, Belarus and Uzbekistan are observer 
governments while Turkmenistan remains as the only country which is not a 
member in the region.37 In case of Middle East, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain are the 
members while Syria, Iraq, Iran, Lebanese Republic are observer states 
negotiating accession. Except for Turkmenistan, all states from the CIS and 
                                                 
37 Countries that are negotiating the accession to the WTO are called observer states. 
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Middle East are either members of the WTO or in the process of accession. 
However, their posts in the AB have not yet been provided for 22 years. 
Therefore, the lack of membership to the WTO cannot be the reason for 
exclusion. 
Next, both regions occupy trade volume that does not justify the 
exclusion. According to the WTO 2015 Regional Merchandise Export 
Profiles, each region holds following percent in the export trade volume.38 
 
Table 2. Export Trade Volume by Region 201539 
Region Percentage of Trade Volume 
1 Europe 37 
2 Asia 29 
3 North America 19 
4 Middle East 4 
5 South and Central America 4 
6 Africa 3 
7 CIS 2 
Source: www.wto.org 
                                                 
38 See Table 2. 
39 2015 World and Regional Merchandise Export Profiles, WTO 
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 Compared to Europe, Asia, and North America which have large 
share in the world trade volume, Middle East and the CIS have smaller 
voice. However, putting aside aside the CIS which has the least share in the 
world trade, South and Central America and Africa retained position in the 
Appellate Body since the establishment. They have similar share of trade 
volume with the Middle East, which has not been represented in the 
Appellate Body. There may be other political or social reasons that Middle 
East countries did not take position in the Appellate Body. However, the 
trade volume cannot be an excuse for the exclusion of the Middle East.  
 Finally, the exclusion may have occurred due to the passive 
participation in the WTO by two regions. This is the most potent cause for 
the exclusion. According to Van Grasstek’s statistics, 245 people served as 
dispute settlement panelists from 1995 to 2012. These individuals came 
from 61 different countries but none from Middle East and CIS countries 
except for Israel.40 However, the participation of the CIS and Middle East is 
on the increase. With the Ukraine’s action of bringing Armenia to the 
Dispute Settlement system of the WTO in July 2010, the CIS began to 
participate in the mechanism. The Middle East also began to play a part in 
                                                 
40 Supra note 20, p. 258 
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the WTO Dispute Settlement mechanism by Qatar bringing the United Arab 
Emirates before the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.  
 In fact, among 14 disputes that were newly brought to the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism in 2017, half of the case were brought by the 
countries that belong to the CIS or Middle East.41 
 
Table 3. Cases brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 2017 
 Dispute 
Number 
Date Complainant Respondent 
1 DS 519 12-Jan-2017 United States China 
2 DS 520 18-Jan-2017 United States Canada 
3 DS 521 27-Jan-2017 
Russian 
Federation 
European Union 
4 DS 522 8-Feb-2017 Brazil Canada 
5 DS 523 8-Mar-2017 Turkey United States 
6 DS 524 8-Mar-2017 Mexico Costa Rica 
7 DS 525 19-May-2017 
Russian 
Federation 
Ukraine 
8 DS 526 31-Jul-2017 Qatar United Arab Emirates 
9 DS 527 31-Jul-2017 Qatar Kingdom of Bahrain 
10 DS 528 31-Jul-2017 Qatar 
Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia 
11 DS 529 1-Sep-2017 Indonesia Australia 
12 DS 530 19-Sep-2017 Ukraine Kazakhstan 
                                                 
41 See Table 3. 
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13 DS 531 28-Sep-2017 United States Canada 
14 DS 532 13-Oct-2017 Ukraine Russian Federation 
 
As the participation of the excluded region grow in the Dispute 
Settlement mechanism, broad representation of the WTO would become a 
more important and disputed issue than now. Reflection of Members from 
diverse legal tradition and nationality will lead to credibility and 
acceptability of the system. 
 The reason for the exclusion is difficult to detect. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be denied that exclusion of the CIS and the Middle East does not 
comply with the DSU Article 17.3. Again there were two standards to assess 
the broad representation of the Appellate Body Membership: 1) No region 
must be excluded from the Appellate Body Member composition 2) In the 
region, certain country should not dictate the position.  
 Due to the exclusion of the two regions, the composition of the AB 
did not meet the first criteria. As a result, the Appellate Body failed to 
represent the WTO membership broadly even under the minimum standard. 
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3.2.2. The Second Trend: Quasi-permanent Seat for Certain States 
 
The second visible trend is that certain countries dominate the 
representation of respective region. 
Figure 4 visualizes the number of times a country has occupied the 
seat in the Appellate Body. The darker the color, the more times a country 
has occupied Appellate Body Member position. The EU is counted as one 
unit. For the past 22 years, four Members from the US has been elected in 
order to represent North America and Japan has taken the seat in the 
Appellate Body for three times. The EU took seat in the AB for three times 
as well. Members from India, Philippines, China, Korea, and Egypt 
produced an Appellate Body Member for two times. 
Figure 4. The number of times a country has occupied seat in the AB 
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  Chances were given to the countries discriminatively. For four 
times, Canada failed to attain a position in the AB to represent North 
America. Also a seat in the Appellate Body is exclusive to Philippines and 
India in South/West Asia. Moreover, Appleton (2016) expressed a concern 
that China may be in the course of having a permanent seat in the Appellate 
Body.42 Eastern and Northern European countries did not yet have seat in 
the AB while wealthier countries in the Western Europe served the AB for 
three terms consecutively. 
The Appellate Body composition fails to meet minimum standard of 
broad representation due to some quasi-permanent seat for some country. 
However, considering the short history of Appellate Body compared to other 
classic courts, chances to correct the composition still remains high in the 
future. 
 Next, the Appellate Body faces overrepresentation of Asia and 
especially East Asia. Table 4 organized nationalities and regions of 
Appellate Body Members for the past 22 years. They are divided into five 
                                                 
42 Supra note 14, p. 12 
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batches according to their starting year of the term.43 
 
Table 4. Nationality and Region of Appellate Body Members 
First Batch 
Term Members Nationality Region 
1995-2000 James Bacchus United States North America 
1995-2000 Christopher Beeby New Zealand Asia 
1995-2001 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann Germany Europe 
1995-2000 Said El-Naggar Egypt Africa 
1995-2001 Florentino Feliciano Philippines Asia 
1995-2001 Julio Lacarte-Muró Uruguay 
Central and 
South America 
1995-2000 Mitsuo Matsushita Japan Asia 
Second Batch 
Term Members Nationality Region 
2000-2008 Georges Michel Abi-Saab Egypt Africa 
2000-2008 Arumugamangalam V. Ganesan India Asia 
2000-2007 Yasuhei Taniguchi Japan Asia 
2001-2009 Luiz Olavo Baptista Brazil 
Central and 
South America 
                                                 
43 The Members of the first batch (James Bacchus through Matsushita) has started to serve 
Appellate Body simultaneously. Due to different resignation timing resulted from personal 
circumstances of first batch Members, the beginning of the term is not identical from the 
second batch. 
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2001-2006 John Lockhart Australia Asia 
2001-2009 Giorgio Sacerdoti Italy Europe 
2003-2007 Merit E. Janow United States North America 
Third Batch 
Term Members Nationality Region 
2006-2013 David Unterhalter South Africa Africa 
2007-2011 Lilia R. Bautista Philippines Asia 
2007-2011 Jennifer Hillman United States North America 
2008-2012 Shotaro Oshima Japan Asia 
2008-2016 Yuejiao Zhang China Asia 
2009-2017 Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández Mexico 
Central and 
South America 
2009-2017 Peter Van den Bossche Belgium Europe 
Fourth Batch 
Term Members Nationality Region 
2011-2019 Ujal Singh Bhatia India Asia 
2011-2019 Thomas R. Graham United States North America 
2012-2016 Seung Wha Chang Korea Asia 
2014-2018 Shree Baboo Chekitan 
Servansing 
Mauritius Africa 
Fifth Batch 
Term Members Nationality Region 
2016-2017 Hyun Chong Kim Korea Asia 
2016-2020 Hong Zhao China Asia 
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The first seven Members for the Appellate Body were chosen from 
five different regions, three from Asia. The second batch of appellate body 
Member’s nationality shows similar composition. Without adding or 
counting out regions, the primary five regions were retained. However, as 
pointed out in the previous section, the United States, Japan and Egypt 
continued to represent North America, Asia and Africa respectively. For 8 
years, United States, Japan and Egypt kept their position. 
Yet, the third batch of Members show change in composition. John 
Lockhart as the last Member for Oceania, Oceania lost its post in the 
Appellate Body after 10 years. Since there are seven regions in the world, 
the opportunity might have been yielded to other regions such as the CIS 
and the Middle East which were excluded from the beginning. However, the 
post lost by Oceania went to East Asia. Japan has been representing East 
Asia for two times and was again elected as a Member in the third batch. At 
the same time in 2008, Chinese Member joined the Appellate Body. In total, 
two Members were from East Asia among seven Members. Except for East 
Asia replacing Oceania, other regions showed similar composition. For 
example, the United States and Japan were serving the AB for consecutive 3 
times. The Philippines which produced a Member in the first batch again 
turned out a Member this time. Africa, Latin America, and Europe sustained 
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the regional post in the AB, but new countries won the chance. 
In the fourth batch, India replaced post for South/West Asia 
although a Member from India has served the AB in the previous second 
batch. For the fourth time, the US again represented North America. After 
Japanese Member’s term finished, Korea replaced the post for East Asia. 
After David Unterhalter who came from South Africa finished his term 
Africa’s post was replaced with a new Member from new country, Mauritius. 
A national from Oceania was not appointed again after the second batch. 
Since two Members from the third batch completed their terms of 
office, two successors who are the Members of the fifth batch were elected. 
Both of them are from East Asia. The Dispute Settlement Body replaced 
Seung Wha Chang from Korea with Hyun Chong Kim from the same 
country, and Yuejiao Zhang from China was succeeded by Hong Zhao also 
from China. 
East Asia is comprised of three countries which are China, Korea 
and Japan. From the third batch, specifically from 2008, two countries 
simultaneously represent East Asia in the AB. As a result, it can be said that 
East Asia is overrepresented in the Appellate Body while Oceania lost its 
post after producing two predecessors. 
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As of 11 November 11, 2017 the following six judges are serving 
the AB. Due to resignation of Kim Hyun Jong, a national of Korea, one seat 
remains vacant.44 
 
Table 5. Current Appellate Body Member 
Term Member Nationality Region 
2011-2019  Ujal Singh Bhatia India Asia 
2011-2019  Thomas R. Graham United States North America 
2009-2017 Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández Mexico 
Central and 
South America 
2014-2018 
Shree Baboo Chekitan 
Servansing 
Mauritius Africa 
2009-2017 Peter Van den Bossche Belgium Europe 
2016-2020 Hong Zhao China Asia 
 
Accordingly, overrepresentation of East Asia is resolved for the 
moment. Appointment of a new Member to fill the vacancy will be another 
opportunity to test the broad representativeness of the Appellate Body. 
 
                                                 
44 See Table 5. 
39 
3.3 Overall Evaluation 
 
The status quo composition of the Appellate Body does not satisfy 
the two criteria set beforehand. Some regions have not been represented in 
the AB and the past composition clearly shows favoritism towards some 
countries in the region, for example the US.  
Lack of WTO membership, small trade volume, passive 
participation in the dispute mechanism were suggested as three potential 
causes for the exclusion of certain regions such as the CIS and Middle East. 
However, the first two causes were denied by empirical evidence while the 
third cause is the most potent cause for the exclusion. The CIS and Middle 
East began to actively participate, at least some countries, in the Dispute 
Settlement mechanism of the WTO. A Member having a nationality of the 
Middle East or the CIS can hopefully be seen in the future. Yet the future is 
not bright. Oceania lost its post despite their active participation in the 
Dispute Settlement system.  
If the degree of broad representation does not improve, the 
legitimacy of the Appellate Body would erode. As repeatedly said, if 
Members do not represent various legal systems of the world, and thereby 
40 
undermine diversity of the court, some countries may become reluctant in 
utilizing the Dispute Settlement mechanism.  
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Chapter IV. The Second Criteria: Nationality 
Influence 
  
 This chapter includes a concept that is very controversial. An issue 
of nationality influence on international judges is deep-rooted controversies 
that had begun from the establishment of international courts. Therefore, 
one should be careful not to misperceive that a judge’s favorable decision 
toward his or her home country means that his or her decision is biased. 
Every circumstance, every decision should be taken into account with 
discreet care. And this chapter only suggests doubt and does not have an 
articulate conclusion since this topic has been controversial and full of 
dissenting and diverse opinions. Introduction of diverse opinions of the 
scholars and at the last tries to apply one of them into the current Appellate 
Body.  
 Gordon, Burton, Falk and Franck (1989) introduce skepticism 
toward national judges in their paper. 45  The question with respect to 
national bias of judges in international courts is deep-rooted in history. The 
                                                 
45 See Gordon, E., Burton, S., Falk, R., & Franck, T. (1989). The Independence and 
Impartiality of International Judges. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society 
of International Law), 83, 508-529. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658513 
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records of 19th and early 20th century arbitration contain wide-spread doubt 
towards international judges’ inclination toward their own government’s 
political and economic interests.46 There are a number of restraints that can 
prevent judges from nationalistic behavior such as ‘courtroom setting, small 
group setting of the panel, and rules of international law’.47 Yet these 
constraints cannot fully overcome the doubts by the skeptics.48  
 Additionally, a view that international judges can hardly stay 
impartial and independent from the home state is prevalent in old 
academia.49  
 Indeed, international courts employ following nationality limit of a 
judge in order to secure independence in their institutional design.50 First, a 
limit on the number of judges from one nationality exist in most 
international courts. Second, the nationality bias is receded by the ad hoc 
judge rules. When one party to the dispute has its own national as a judge on 
the bench, the other party can offset this by appointing an ad hoc judge. 
Finally, some international courts have a rule that a judge has to excuse from 
                                                 
46 Supra note 45, p.510 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Supra note 20. 
50 Supra note 20, p.109 
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the cases that includes his or her nationality.51 
  
4.1 Related Rule and Interpretation 
  
 The Appellate Body also has a rule that concerns nationality of the 
Members. The DSU has two related articles to the nationality issue of the 
Appellate Body composition.  
 
Appellate Body Working Procedures for the Appellate Review, 
 Article 6 
(2) The Members constituting a division shall be selected on the 
basis  of rotation, while taking into account the principles of 
random selection, unpredictability and opportunity for all Members 
to serve regardless of their national origin. 
 
DSU 17.1 
 A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The 
                                                 
51 Supra note 20, p. 89 
44 
 Appellate Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be 
 composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one 
 case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in 
 rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in the working 
 procedures of the Appellate Body. 
 
The WTO Appellate Body rules differ from that of panel’s where national of 
the dispute party and third party are banned from serving as a panelist.52 In 
that the WTO Appellate Body allow the national of the dispute to serve the 
case.  
 According to the Article 6 (2) of the Working Procedures for 
Appellate Review, the Members constituting the division hearing and 
deciding a particular appeal are selected on the basis of rotation taking into 
account the principles of random selection and unpredictability, and 
opportunity for all Members to serve, regardless of their nationality is 
guaranteed.53 Contrary to the process for panelist selection, the nationality 
is not considered for the selection of Appellate Body Members and they can 
                                                 
52 DSU Article 8.3 
53 WTO Appellate Body, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WTO Doc. 
WT/AB/WP/3, para. 6 
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be assigned to cases that involve their countries of origin.54 
 
4.2 Hypothesis Tested 
 
 Whether a nationality of a judge affects impartiality and 
independence of the international court is a controversial issue and thereby 
demands a cautious approach.  
 In order to test the hypothesis of judicial nationalism, I will analyze 
the nationality influence on the Appellate Body by reviewing earlier 
literatures that contemplated through nationality influence on the 
international court or Appellate Body. 55  There are both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses. I will look into their methods and discuss about the 
results. 
 
                                                 
54 Bossche, P. (2005). The law and policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, cases, and 
materials / Peter van den Bossche. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 
247 
55 The influence of nationality in this section refers to influence on results of the Appellate 
Report. 
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4.2.1 Studies arguing weak relationship between the result and 
nationality of a Judge 
  
 Jackson (1998) points out structural inevitability for impartiality in 
the Appellate Body. He asserts that “it is fair to say that one cannot detect 
nationality influence on the Appellate Body” on the ground that the 
Appellate Body report shows no indication of particular authorship or 
provision for dissenting opinions and thereby attributing itself only to three 
members of the roster which sat in the division.56 
 Also, Vermulst, E., Mavroidis, P. C., & Waer, P. (1999) added that 
an AB Member having the nationality of one of the disputants does not have 
influence on the Appellate Body ruling since the Panel proceeding, the 
previous stage, blocks members of the disputing countries from serving as 
panelists.57 Moreover, the random distribution of cases by the lottery system 
detaches the AB cases from the influence of nationality. 
 Dannenbaum (2012) argues that nationality of a judge is no unique 
factor other than character traits and combination of experiences of a judge. 
                                                 
56 Jackson, J. H. (1998). Dispute Settlement and the WTO: Emerging Problems. Journal of 
International Economic Law, 1(3), 329-351, p. 341 
57 Vermulst, E., Mavroidis, P. C., & Waer, P. (1999). The Functioning of the Appellate Body 
after Four Years: Towards Rule Integrity. Journal of World Trade, 33(2), 1–50, p.16 
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He elaborates that “every judge is the product of a unique combination of 
experiences and character traits, many of which are relevant to her 
perspective on law and society.”58 
 A study conducted by J. Maton and C. Maton (2007) observes 
whether and how it is possible for powerful Complainant states to have 
leverage on the Panel or Appellate Body proceedings through extra-legal 
means. Their study bears significance in that it clarifies whether exertion of 
external influence of states beside legal interpretation is possible. The 
influence may be in the form of “deliberate action taken by states, or 
strategic choices made by Panels or the Appellate Body”59, and the extra-
legal means were classified into three categories–political power, economic 
power and practical capacity. However, the result did not show the tendency 
that strong states substantially enjoys high rate of winning. The two authors 
tested the cases of the EC and US considering their high rate of participation 
in the WTO dispute either as complainant or respondent and strong 
economic influence. According to their analysis, it is true that the EC and 
US succeeds obtaining favorable result in the dispute settlement mechanism 
                                                 
58 Supra note 20, p.121 
59 Maton, J. & Maton, C. (2007). Independence Under Fire: Extra-legal Pressures and 
Coalition Building in WTO Dispute Settlement. Journal of International Economic Law, 
10(2), 317–334, p. 325 
48 
of the WTO. Nevertheless, this cannot be interpreted as bias. When the 
regression analysis for the trend was executed, the result proves that 
winning rate and national bias have weak relationship.60 
 
4.2.2 Studies arguing strong relationship between the result and 
nationality   
  
 However, opposite view exists. Posner and de Figueiredo (2005) 
classified how a national identity influences the decision making of the 
judges in three causes: psychological, economical, or via selection effects.61 
First, psychology deviates a judge from impartiality since judges have 
“spent their careers in national service as diplomats, legal advisors, 
administrators, and politicians.”62 This applies to the AB Members since 
they led political, legal or diplomatic career in their nations. Second, judges 
are swayed by economic motivation. Judges need various supports from 
their home state. First, home support for international judges is essential for 
the reappointment. Second, after their terms the judges have to go back to 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 Eric A. Posner; Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo. (2005). Is the International Court of Justice 
Biased. Journal of Legal Studies, 34, 599–630, p. 608 
62 Ibid. 
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their home state. Judges who have served in international courts have big 
probability to gain a seat in the government after their terms in the 
organization. 63  Lastly, impartial judges are excluded from the very 
beginning through the selection process. Governments nominate judges, and 
in this process they can ensure that their nominees are not too independent 
from the government.64 
 Smith, J. M. (2003) also showed skeptical point of view in the 
opaque rotation process and high rate of a Member assigned to cases against 
his or her home country.65 The way of assigning cases to the Appellate 
Body Members is based on rotation. Even so, Smith raises a suspicion about 
the randomness of the process since cases that involves the US or EC has 
higher percentage of their nationals serving the case compared to completely 
random process would have. 
 The study of Garrett and Smith (1999) did not specifically deal with 
nationality issue. Yet, they discovered the Appellate Body’s reluctance to 
make strong and unequivocal adverse rulings against powerful WTO 
Members by examining particular decisions that involve the US and the 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Smith, J. M. (2003). The WTO Dispute Settlement: the Politics of Procedure in Appellate 
Body Rulings. World Trade Review, 2:1, 65-100 
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EC.66 
 
4.3 Application to the Current Appellate Body 
 
 In order to verify whether there exists home state advantage in the 
Appellate Body, 128 cases that were brought to the AB will be studied in 
various ways.67 
 
4.3.1. Posner and De Figueiredo “Home-state Advantage” (2005) 
 
As a methodology to study impact of nationality on the AB decision, 
I will apply Posner and De Figueiredo’s earlier study on nationality 
influence to the ICJ proceedings to the Appellate Body.68 
They tested whether Judges of the ICJ favored their home states in 
proceedings. They set a hypothesis that ICJ judges vote in favor of their 
                                                 
66 Supra note 9. 
67 130 cases were brought to the Appellate Body as of November 2017, yet they were 
counted as 128 in this thesis. One case was withdrawn by the Appellee, India. Another case, 
Dispute Number 27 was merged into one case since the EC, appellant, filed appeal 
separately, yet two cases were handled by same AB Members. 
68 See Posner and De Figueiredo (2005), supra note 52. 
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home state. Then they divided the ICJ judges into party judges who has 
same nationality with either applicant or respondent, and nonparty judges 
and counted the percentage of favorable proceeding made by a party judge 
and nonparty judge respectively. 
 According to the logic of De Figueiredo (2005), the methodology to 
judge the national bias of the Appellate Body was set. 
 However, there was one obstacle to apply their method to the 
Appellate Body. In contrast with the ICJ judgements where names of Judges 
who votes for and against are identified, opinions expressed in the Appellate 
Body’s reports by individuals serving on the Appellate Body have to stay 
anonymous.69 Since the Appellate Body report is the result of agreement of 
three AB Members, individual AB Member’s favoritism who has the same 
nationality with the parties to the dispute is undiscoverable. Therefore, the 
nationality influence can be measured only indirectly and may neutralize by 
other judges. 
 However, the purpose of the study lies in finding out whether case 
that involve an AB Member who has same nationality with the parties to the 
dispute is influenced by the nationality or not. Therefore, this study would 
                                                 
69 DSU Article 17.10 
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gratify doubts of the states whether they could trust the Appellate Body 
Members although they have other dispute party’s national or they do not 
have their own national among three Appellate Members. This is significant 
since the AB does not provide the ad hoc judge system of the ICJ which 
allows the party to choose an ad hoc judge if the counter party has its own 
national on the bench.70 
  Accordingly, one difference made in Posner and De Figueiredo’s 
methodology is that they calculated the ICJ by the unit of “votes”, and AB 
will be calculated in “cases” 
 
 Table 6. Four categories of the AB Case results 
1  2 
AB Members in charge have same 
nationality with the Appellant + 
Favorable Result for the Appellant 
AB Members have same nationality 
with the Appellee + Favorable Result 
for the Appellee 
3 4 
AB Members have different 
nationality with the Appellant + 
Favorable Result for the Appellant 
AB Members have different 
nationality with the Appellee + 
Favorable Result for the Appellee 
 
 128 cases were brought to the AB as of November 2017, and each 
                                                 
70 ICJ Statute Article 31.2 
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case will be categorized into four groups as the Table 6 in order to test 
national bias. Then, the proportion of favorable result for each four 
categories will be compared. When a same country is both appellant and 
appellee due to the cross-appeal, such a case is counted twice but separately 
in each category, once in appellant side and once in appellee side.  
 The favorable result should defined in advance of the analysis. A 
simple logic of defining the one who violated the WTO rule and hence were 
asked to bring its action into conformity by the DSB is the loser and the 
other side is the winner is implemented. For instance, assume that Korea is 
appellant and Thailand is appellee. If the Appellate Body report demands 
Korea to bring action into conformity with the WTO rule, Korea is the loser 
and the proceeding in this case is favorable to Thailand. 
 By comparing the numerical value of four categories, the impact of 
the nationality of the AB Member to the AB decision can be drawn out. This 
is to find out whether the existence of an AB Member that has same 
nationality with the party to the dispute draws out favorable result for the 
relevant party.  
 
1) ICJ Results 
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 In the study of Posner and De Figueiredo (2005), they attained a 
surprising result that the ICJ Judges are biased since “Judges vote in favor 
of their home states”.71 
 
Figure 5. National Bias of the ICJ Judges 
 
 While they voted in favor of non-home parties with the probability 
of 50.7%; they voted favorably for home states with the chance of 88.9% for 
applicants, and 89.9% for respondents.72 Posner and De Figueiredo argued 
that “substantial evidence that party judges vote in favor of their home state” 
                                                 
71 Supra note 52, p. 615 
72 Ibid. 
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exists.73 
 However, they suggested two means that such an impartiality could 
be offset. First, the party judges can offset each other’s vote, and unbiased 
nonparty judges’ votes make it possible for the ICJ as a whole produce 
impartial decisions.74 
 
2) AB Results 
  
 Now, the logic of Posner and De Figueiredo will be applied to the 
Appellate Body. As iterated beforehand, “cases” that contain national 
Members will be calculated. The database listing nationality of the AB 
Members’ and parties to the dispute in entire 128 cases can be found in the 
Annex 2. 
 Before executing a test for the AB, the neutrality was tested in the 
128 cases that were brought to the WTO, and the result is laid out in the 
Table 7.75 In the first row, Members’ relationship with the parties to the 
                                                 
73 See Figure 5. 
74 Supra note 52, p. 615 
75 See Table 7. 
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dispute is displayed. There are two possibilities. An AB Member can have 
same nationality with the parties—appellant, appellee, or both76—or may 
have no relationship. 
 
Table 7. Neutrality Test 
 
Members’ Relation with Nationality of 
Neutral 
Appellant Appellee Both 
Number of 
Cases 
45/128 48/128 68/128 31/128 
Probability 0.35 0.38 0.53 0.24 
 
 AB Members having nationality of the appellant were involved in 
45 cases, and similarly in 48 cases they had same nationality as the appellee. 
For over half of the cases, the AB Members’ nationality corresponded with 
the parties to the dispute both appellant and appellee side. The neutral cases 
which involve no AB Members of a national from either appellant or 
appellee were only 31 cases, which occupies 24 percent from the entire 
                                                 
76 Three Appellate Members take charge of a case, hence one judge may have nationality of 
an appellant while another judge have nationality of appellee. 
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case.77 This shows that the Appellate Body shows low rate of neutrality. 
Although AB Members happened to serve on cases that involves their own 
country based on random distribution, the neutrality rate is significantly low. 
 Having the neutrality checked, the nationality influence on 
Appellate Body’s decision is arranged in the Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Ratio of Favorable Result for the AB 
 
In Favor of Appellant 
 
In Favor of Appellee 
Judge Ratio % 
 
Ratio % 
National 1 25/48 0.52 
 
2 33/54 0.61 
Nonparty 3 15/80 0.19 
 
4 65/74 0.88 
                      
The result is complex for the Appellate Body compared to that of 
the ICJ. The ICJ had clear distinction between votes of party judge and non-
party judge (vertical comparison). The party judges showed significantly 
higher proportion of favorable vote for their home country and this trend 
was common either for the appellant or appellee (horizontal comparison). 
However, the Appellate Body shows mixed results: 
                                                 
77 See Table 9. 
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1. Vertical Comparison: (influence of nationality factor in favorable ruling) 
Vertical comparison between category 1 & 3, and 2 & 4 is to test the 
influence of existence of an AB Member whose nationality is party to 
dispute in making favorable rulings towards home state parties.78 In the 
case of Appellant (category 1 &3), the cases that had national of appellant 
attained favorable ruling to the appellant at the rate of 0.52. Interestingly, in 
neutral cases where AB Member that had same nationality with the 
appellant were not involved, appellant won the case with the probability of 
0.19. The existence of a national AB Member made 0.31 percent difference 
in winning the case. 
However, the result for the appellee side is different (category 2 &4) 
is different. They showed higher ratio of winning the case compared to 
result of appellant regardless of the nationality influence. The major 
difference is that appellee had higher chance of winning the case in neutral 
cases where they had no home AB Member serving the case: appellee won 
the case with the ratio of 0.61 when they had AB Member of its nationality 
in the case while neutral AB Members gave favorable proceeding for the 
appellee with the ratio of 88%. 
                                                 
78 See Table 7 for categories. 
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To sum up, having AB Members of the same nationality as the 
parties to the dispute had lower influence in results compared to the ICJ. 
Although appellants having the AB Member who has same nationality as 
theirs produced higher winning chance by 0.31 percentage, the ratio of 0.52 
is hard to be interpreted that the AB Members have favoritism towards their 
state parties. Also, for the appellee side, appellees had more chance of 
attaining favorable result when the case was served by neutral judges. 
Consequently, the hypothesis that there is a home state advantage is 
unsubstantiated. 
 
2. Horizontal Comparison (influence of appellant and appellee factor in 
favorable ruling) 
The AB shows difference between ratio of appellant and appellee. 
Appellee has higher ratio of winning regardless of involvement of national 
AB Member. The non-party AB Members gave favorable result for 
appellant with the ratio of 0.19 while appellee received 0.88 percent of 
favorable result. The complexity lies in the essence of the Appellate Body. 
Appellate Body has limited jurisdiction as mentioned in the Chapter 1, 
Introduction. The investigations and facts made by the panel cannot be 
touched and the Appellate Body only deals with questions of law in the 
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panel report. The results hardly change. In fact, among cases that involved 
national AB Members, there were only two cases where the winner and 
loser changed.79 Losers (appellant) usually make an appeal; the AB rarely 
change the result; the result in the panel is sustained. In other words, 
winners (appellee) stay as winners. This can explain why there is big 
difference between the proportion of appellant and appellee. 
 The finding of application to the Appellate Body shows the positive 
result that the AB ruling and nationality of the pertinent Member have weak 
relationship. 
 
4.4 Overall Evaluation 
 
 The home state advantage does not distinctively appear in the 
Appellate Body. Yet the neutrality of the case is worrisome due to high 
proportion of Members serving cases that involve their home states. This is 
especially apprehensive for the parties bringing case to the Appellate Body 
since the organization does not have any device of balancing the nationality 
                                                 
79 DS 139, 142 and DS 296. 
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influence as the ITLOS and the ICJ have.80 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
80 The ITLOS is aware with the nationality influence of a judge to the ruling. The ITLOS 
statute reads: 
Article 17 
Nationality of members 
1. Members of the Tribunal of the nationality of any of the parties to a dispute shall retain 
their right to participate as members of the Tribunal. 
2. If the Tribunal, when hearing a dispute, includes upon the bench a member of the 
nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to participate as a 
member of the Tribunal. 
Just as the Appellate Body, the ITLOS does not limit the participation of a Judge who has 
nationality of any of the parties to the dispute. However, any other party can choose a 
person to participate in the case, hence offsetting the influence of nationality in producing 
results. 
ICJ also has a device to offset the influence of a national judge. Under Article 31 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Statute of the Court, a State party to a case before the 
International Court of Justice which does not have a judge of its nationality on the Bench 
may choose a person to sit as judge ad hoc in that specific case under the conditions laid 
down in Articles 35 to 37 of the Rules of Court. Before taking up his/her duties, a judge ad 
hoc is required to make the same solemn declaration as an elected Member of the Court. 
He/she does not necessarily have to have (and often does not have) the nationality of the 
designating State. See ICJ website, http://www.icj-cij.org/en/judges-ad-hoc for more 
information. 
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Chapter V. The Third Criteria: Expertise in Trade 
Remedy 
  
 Beside impartiality, legitimacy of a court also stems from quality of 
judges, from their expertise of the Judges on pertinent subject of the matter 
of the court. 81  In the case of the Appellate Body, the ruling made by 
Members can demand a state financial compensation which directly affects 
a state’s economic interest. Therefore, Appellate Body Members’ ability to 
make a correct decision has an impact on credibility, and furthermore, 
legitimacy of the Appellate Body.  
 
5.1 Related Rule and Interpretation 
 
DSU 17.3 
The Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognized 
authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade 
and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally (…) 
 
                                                 
81 C. Basak, A. Koch, and N. Bruch (2011). The Legitimacy of the European Court of 
Human Rights: The View from the Ground. Unpublished manuscript, University College 
London. http://ecthrproject.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ecthrlegitimacyreport.pdf 
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 Regarding such aspect, the DSU Article 17.3 stipulates Appellate 
Members’ expertise in law, international trade, and the subject matter of the 
covered agreements generally. Expertise in law and international trade is 
quite explicit. Yet the ‘subject matter of the covered agreements generally’ 
needs further description.  
 144 Appellate Reports have been circulated from 1996 to 2016 and 
they addressed following agreements: DSU; The General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994); WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM); Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping 
Agreement); Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (WTO Agreement); The WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
(Agriculture); The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT); The 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
(SPS); Article XIX of GATT 1994 and the Agreement on Safeguards 
(Safeguards Agreement); General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs); Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); WTO 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (APC); and import licensing. 
 These agreements are what a WTO Appellate Body Member should 
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show expertise at. Among these various agreements addressed in the 
Appellate Body, this thesis will focus on legal competence of the Appellate 
Body on trade remedy cases since they are key subject dealt in the WTO 
Appellate Body, and at the same time, controversial topic that instigate 
dissatisfaction among countries, especially China and the US. Significance 
of trade remedy issue has been explained in Chapter 3 already. 
 
5.2 Evaluation of WTO Appellate Body’s Competence on Trade 
Remedy Issue 
 
5.2.1 Criteria for Evaluation and Observation 
 
 The vagueness of the word ‘expertise’ makes it hard to assess 
Appellate Body members’ expertise. Yet, education and job experiences 
could be a strong reference to test one’s expertise. In the same sense, 
Appleton and other literatures adopted education and job experience as a 
standard to evaluate expertise of a Member. Also, I thought legal support by 
an expert group can add proficiency to the Appellate Body. 
 After inspecting the status-quo of the Appellate Body’s competence 
for dealing with the trade remedy issue, two observations were made. First, 
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the standing Appellate Body lacks Members who have expertise or 
experience in trade remedy area. Second, legal assistance from the trade 
remedy experts of Rules Division in the panel level is not provided in the 
AB level, hence eroding the legal competence of the Appellate Body on 
trade remedy issue. 
 
5.2.2 First Observation: Individual Level 
 
 The first observation will be made in the individual level, delving 
into competence of the Appellate Body Members on trade remedy issue. In 
doing so, the Members’ past job experiences and education are diagramed in 
the Table 9.82 The contents in the table referred to the biography posted on 
the WTO website and variables are drawn out from Appleton’s study.83  
 
Table 9. Appellate Body Members’ Background 
First Batch 
Term Members 
Areas of 
Study 
GATT 
panel 
Background 
                                                 
82 See Table 9. 
83 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm 
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experie
nce 
1995-
2000 
James Bacchus 
Law, 
History 
No 
Congressman, 
Special Assistant to 
the USTR 
1995-
2000 
Christopher 
Beeby 
Law No 
Ambassador, career 
diplomat 
1995-
2001 
Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann 
Law No 
Professor, Director 
General Legal 
Services for EU 
Comission 
1995-
2000 
Said El-Naggar 
Economi
cs, Law 
No 
Professor, 
international civil 
servant (UNCTAD, 
UN, World Bank) 
1995-
2001 
Florentino 
Feliciano 
Law No 
Supreme Court 
Judge, private 
practitioner 
1995-
2001 
Julio Lacarte-
Muró 
Trade and 
economic
s 
backgrou
nd 
Yes 
Minister, 
Ambassador, career 
diplomat 
1995-
2000 
Mitsuo 
Matsushita 
Law No Professor 
Second Batch 
Term Members 
Areas of 
Study 
GATT 
panel 
experie
nce 
Background 
2000-
2008 
Georges Michel 
Abi-Saab 
Law, 
economic
s, 
political 
science 
No Professor 
2000-
2008 
Arumugamangal
am V. Ganesan 
Chemistr
y 
Yes 
Commerce 
Secretary, career 
civil servant 
2000-
2007 
Yasuhei 
Taniguchi 
Law No Professor 
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2001-
2009 
Luiz Olavo 
Baptista 
Law, 
Business 
administr
ation 
No Professor, Attorney 
2001-
2006 
John Lockhart Law, arts No 
International civil 
servant (ADB, 
World Bank), judge 
2001-
2009 
Giorgio 
Sacerdoti 
Law No Professor 
2003-
2007 
Merit E. Janow Law Yes 
Professor, Deputy 
Assistant US Trade 
Representative 
Third Batch 
Term Members 
Areas of 
Study 
GATT 
panel 
experie
nce 
Background 
2006-
2013 
David 
Unterhalter 
Law Yes 
Professor, private 
practitioner 
2007-
2011 
Lilia R. Bautista 
Law, 
business 
No 
Career civil servant, 
senior 
undersecretary, 
Ambassador to WTO 
2007-
2011 
Jennifer 
Hillman 
Law, 
education 
No 
Member of the US 
International Trade 
Commission 84  , 
chief legal counsel to 
the USTR 
2008-
2012 
Shotaro Oshima Law No 
Ambassador to 
WTO, career 
diplomat, civil 
servant 
2008-
2016 
Yuejiao Zhang Law No 
Professor, private 
attorney, 
international civil 
servant (ADB, 
                                                 
84 International Trade Commission is an agency that makes decisions related to anti-
dumping and countervailing legal issues, and conducts safeguard investigations. 
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World Bank), civil 
servant85 
2009-
2017 
Ricardo 
Ramírez-
Hernández 
Law No 
Private practitioner, 
civil servant 
2009-
2017 
Peter Van den 
Bossche 
Law No 
Professor, Appellate 
Body Secretariat 
Fourth Batch 
Term Members 
Areas of 
Study 
WTO 
panel 
experie
nce 
Background 
2011-
2019 
Ujal Singh 
Bhatia 
Economi
cs 
Yes 
Ambassador to the 
WTO, career civil 
servant 
2011-
2019 
Thomas R. 
Graham 
Law, 
internatio
nal 
relations, 
economic
s 
No 
Private Practitioner, 
civil servant 86 , 
international civil 
servant (UNCTAD) 
2012-
2016 
Seung Wha 
Chang 
Law Yes 
Professor, Judge, 
private practitioner 
2014-
2018 
Shree Baboo 
Chekitan 
Servansing 
Sociology
, foreign 
affairs 
and 
internatio
nal trade 
No 
Ambassador to 
WTO, career civil 
servant 
Fifth Batch 
Term Members 
Areas of 
study 
WTO 
panel 
experie
nce 
Background 
                                                 
85 She served as the Director-General of Law and Treaties at the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Cooperation. She drafted Chinese Anti-Dumping Regulation and the Anti-
Subsidy Regulation. 
86 Deputy General Counsel, US Trade Representative 
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2016-
2017 
Hyun Chong 
Kim 
Law No 
Civil servant, 
ambassador to UN, 
international civil 
servant (UN 
Economic and Social 
Council)87,  Appellat
e Body Secretariat, 
WTO Legal Affairs 
Division, Professor 
2016-
2020 
Hong Zhao Law No Civil servant 
Source: WTO Appellate Body Member Biography and Appleton (2016) 
 The Appellate Body Members’ high level of education and various 
social positions they have gone through are impressive. However, 
development of expertise in trade remedy is a different issue from one’s 
education level and high class social positions.  
 This paper intends not to criticize the Appellate Body Members but 
rather the criticism directs towards the system and the DSB for overlooking 
the significance of the trade remedy. This is to criticize the system which 
does not consider trade remedy as a significant criteria when appointing a 
Member not to place doubt on individual qualification of the Members. 
 The truth is—putting Members’ devoted years of education and 
admirable career aside—the Appellate Body generally lacks pundits in trade 
remedy area. As aforementioned, the expertise is measured with education 
                                                 
87 Vice President of the UN Economic and Social Council 
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and profession. I would like to focus on the profession as the standard to test 
one’s expertise since one’s area of study is in line with one’s profession. I 
considered following professions as capable to acquire expertise in trade 
remedy: private practitioner who have dealt with multiple trade remedy 
cases, and civil servant who worked for the specialized governmental 
department for trade remedy.88 
 3 Members out of 27 satisfy this comparatively lenient standard.  
 First, David Unterhalter can be seen as competent in trade remedy 
since he handled a large number of cases in the fields of trade law, 
competition law, constitutional law, and commercial law as a practicing 
advocate. He gained expertise in trade remedy by representing different 
parties in trade remedy cases in South African court. The leading trade 
remedy cases he took charge of are: 
 Samsung (anti-dumping duties in the cable industry) 
 Johnson and Johnson (anti-dumping investigation in health care 
products) 
 Ranbaxy (anti-dumping in the pharmaceutical industry) 
                                                 
88 Peter Van den Bossche and Kim Hyun Jong have worked for the Appellate Body 
Secretariat, former as a Counsellor and subsequently Acting Director and the latter as a 
senior lawyer. These two Members’ expertise in trade remedy is not distinctively noticeable. 
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 Prestige Holdings (revision of duties) 
 Brenco v Minister of Trade and Industry (judicial review of an 
anti-dumping investigation) 
 Scaw Metals v ITAC (urgent injunctive relief and judicial 
review of a sunset review) 
With the expertise acquired by dealing with before mentioned cases, he also 
advised South African authorities on the revision of the trade remedies 
legislation and has acted in many cases of judicial review concerning the 
domestic regulator.89 
 The second Member who has expertise in trade remedy is Jennifer 
Hillman. Her nine years’ experience as a Commissioner at the United States 
International Trade Commission (USITC) explicitly demonstrates her 
proficiency in trade remedy issue. As a Commissioner, she rendered 
decisions in more than 600 investigations on imports that injured US 
industries by dumping or illegal subsidies.90 
 Thomas R. Graham is the third member who attained judicial 
                                                 
89 His biographies are available at https://www.monckton.com/barrister/david-unterhalter-
sc/ and at the WTO website. 
90 Her biography is available from https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/hillman-
jennifer-a.cfm# 
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acumen in trade remedy sector by working as a private practitioner. 
According to his biography in the WTO website, he was senior counsel of 
the international trade practice at King & Spalding, and at the same time he 
established international trade practice at Skadden, Arps. Also he 
represented various respondents in trade remedy cases.91 
 When converted into percentage, only 11.1 % of whole Members 
have expertise in trade remedy issue while around 50% of the cases dealt in 
the Appellate Body involve trade remedy agreements. Considering the 
number of cases that involve trade remedy, the number of Members who are 
apt in interpreting trade remedy rules and applying them to real cases is too 
small. 
 There have been 66 trade remedy cases so far. However, 14 cases 
involved three Members who had expertise in trade remedy. Considering 
that only 21.2% cases were dealt by experts in trade remedy, the legitimacy 
of the Appellate Body perilous regarding the trade remedy case.92 
 
5.2.3 Second Observation: Structural level 
  
                                                 
91 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/popup_thomas_graham_e.htm 
92 See Annex 1. The cases served by Hillman, Unterhalter, and Graham are colored in grey. 
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 The previous chapter focused on assessing Appellate Body’s 
competence in trade remedy by looking at individual judge’s competence. In 
this part, the Appellate Body’s competence in trade remedy issue will be 
tested by observing the structure of the organization. I have mentioned that 
legal support by a trade remedy expert group can add and complement 
expertise to the Appellate Body. The representative example is the WTO 
panel’s Rules Division.  
 The WTO website introduces role of Rules Division as “(…) 
providing all necessary implementation assistance, counselling and expert 
advice to WTO members concerning the above agreements (anti-dumping, 
subsidies and countervailing measures, safeguards, trade-related investment 
measures, state-trading and civil aircraft) providing secretaries and legal 
officers to WTO dispute settlement panels involving these agreements and 
participating in the WTO technical assistance programme”.93 
 The composition of the Rules Division shows its expertise in trade 
remedy. It is consisted of internal bodies such as Negotiating Group on 
Rules, the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, the Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Committee on Safeguards, the 
Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures, the Committee on Trade 
                                                 
93 https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/div_e.htm 
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in Civil Aircraft, the Working Party on State-Trading Enterprises, the 
Permanent Group of Experts of the Subsidies Agreement as well as the 
Informal Group on Anti-Circumvention and the Working Group on 
Implementation, both concerning the Agreement on Anti-Dumping.94 
 The Rules Division is currently directed by Johann Human, the 
former Head of the Trade Remedies Unit of South Africa, panelist, and 
author of A Handbook on Anti-Dumping Investigations. Although the 
information of employees is not made public, the WTO Annual Report 
introduces new recruits. According to the Report, Seref Gokav Coskun, a 
technical trade specialist was recruited in 2015, who was the former Head of 
Section at the Dumping and Countervailing Duties Investigations 
Department of Turkey’s Ministry of the Economy. As a practitioner, he 
actively involved in Turkey’s trade policy implementation, and conducted 
several trade remedy investigations.95 
 In contrast to the panel, the Appellate Body has a general support 
group, the WTO Appellate Body Secretariat in which director of the 
Secretariat and a team of ten lawyers and four support staffs provide legal 
and administrative support to the Appellate Body to general matters dealt in 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95 WTO Annual Report 2015 
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the appeals.  
 The absence of the expert group specializing in trade remedy for the 
Appellate Body is a serious problem considering Appellate Body’s high 
dependence on Secretariat. Compared to other international courts, panels 
and the Appellate Body has stricter time limits of 90 days. Therefore, it 
encourages panels and the Appellate Body to rely more on Secretariat’s 
expertise.96  
 Moreover, the Secretariat strongly influences the Appellate Body 
decisions. Appleton explains the Secretariat’s influence on Appellate Body 
as follows: 
“Certain senior Members of the Appellate Body Secretariat have held 
their positions far longer than sitting Appellate Body Members and to 
some extent serve as the guardians of continuity. In many if not most 
disputes, the Appellate Body Secretariat has a much better 
understanding of WTO law and practice than sitting Appellate Body 
Members. The Secretariat understand the judicial history, the gradual 
evolution of judicial thinking on certain issues, and they often play an 
important role advising Appellate Body Members and, as already 
                                                 
96 Shaffer, G., Elsig, M., & Puig, S. (2016). The Law and Politics of WTO Dispute 
Settlement. UC Irvine School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper, 10, 1–32, p.13 
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noted, drafting Appellate Body decisions.”97 
 
 To sum up, Appellate Body Secretariat is a body that bears 
substantial importance in that Appellate Body decisions depend on the 
Secretariat heavily. Nevertheless, the problem is that the current Appellate 
Body Secretariat does not possess expertise on trade remedy that Appellate 
Body can rely on. According to an interview with the trade law expert98, the 
Appellate Body Secretariat does not have pool of lawyers who have 
expertise specified in trade remedy. This contrasts the Rules Division of the 
panel. 
  
5.3 Overall Evaluation 
  
 Appellate Body’s competence on trade remedy is worrisome. Only 
11% of the Appellate Body Members have expertise in trade remedy while 
half of the Appellate cases are trade remedy cases. Moreover, the Secretariat 
which is the single helping hand for the Appellate Body does not have 
                                                 
97 Appleton, supra note 39, p. 15 
98 Anonymous. Personal interview. 27 November 2017. 
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competence in trade remedy as well. The quality of the Appellate Body 
report has possibility of slipping behind that of panel’s on trade remedy 
issue.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
Chapter VI. Conclusion 
 
 The legitimacy of the Appellate Body was tested with three criteria: 
broad representation for the diversity and accessibility of the court; 
nationality influence for the fairness and neutrality of the court; expertise in 
trade remedy for quality of rulings. 
 In the first and third criteria, problems were detected. The Appellate 
Body rather partially represented the WTO Membership than broadly 
representing it compared to other classical courts. An AB Member from the 
CIS and Middle East have been never appointed while East Asia has been 
overrepresented, and certain states have occupied the seat repeatedly. Also, 
the Appellate Body Members who are expert in trade remedy is well below 
the demand when trade remedy cases occupy approximately half of the 
disputes brought to the WTO. Nevertheless, the serious problem was not 
detected in second criteria. The intactness between nationality of an 
Appellate Member and favorable decision for the home state was weak. Yet 
the neutrality of the case was worrisome. 
 There are also inside voices from the Appellate Body for the reform 
of the organization. The former Member of the Appellate Body, Georgio 
Sacerdoti suggested following possible remedial solutions for the 
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independence and impartiality of the organization:  
 Staffing the Appellate Body more adequately 
 Increasing the number of Appellate Body members from seven to 
nine 
 Making their position permanent, a status that would also better 
ensure in the future the selection of competent, diverse and truly 
independent judges  
 Replacing their four-year term, renewable once, with one non-
renewable seven-year term, so to avoid any possible improper 
interference with their independence and impartiality by the WTO 
members through the renewal process.99 
However, it seems that Appellate Body has a long way to go. The past 
discussions by the WTO Members regarding the reform of the DSU on this 
matter shows meager progress due to failure of reaching the consensus. 
 If the problems above are not handled, the legitimacy of the 
Appellate Body would gradually wear away.  
                                                 
99 Sacerdoti, Giorgio, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Consolidating Success and 
Confronting New Challenges (June 1, 2016). Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2809122 
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 As of November 2017, the WTO Appellate Body is facing a grave 
momentum since the DSB has to fill three vacancies that would occur 
before the end of 2017.100 The WTO DSB could use this opportunity of new 
appointment in order to fix the problem and improve the legitimacy of the 
WTO Appellate Body. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 Kim Hyun Jong resigned from the post due to government service. Term of Peter Van 
den Bossche and Ricardo Ramírez-Hernández ends in 2017. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1. Votes of Party and Nonparty Members in Proceeding of the 
Appellate Body 101 
Dispute 
Number 
Appellant Appellee Respective Nationality of the judges Loser 1 2 3 4 
2 US 
Brazil, 
Venezuel
a 
Philippin
es 
New 
Zealand 
Japan US 
   
o 
8, 10, 11 
Japan, 
US 
Japan, 
US, 
Canada, 
EC 
Uruguay 
United 
States 
Egypt Japan o o 
  
24 
Costa 
Rica 
United 
States 
Germany Philippines Japan US 
  
o 
 
22 
Philippin
es, Brazil 
Phillippin
es, Brazil 
Egypt Germany Uruguay 
Philipp
ines    
o 
33 India US 
New 
Zealand 
United 
States 
Japan US 
  
o 
 
31 
Canada, 
US 
Canada, 
US 
Japan Germany Uruguay 
Canad
a    
o 
27 
EC, 
Ecuador, 
Guatemal
a, 
Honduras
, Mexico, 
US 
EC, 
Ecuador, 
Guatemal
a, 
Honduras
, Mexico, 
US 
United 
States 
New 
Zealand 
Egypt EC o o 
  
50 India US Uruguay 
United 
States 
New 
Zealand 
India 
 
o 
  
26, 48 
EC, US, 
Canada 
EC, US, 
Canada 
Philippin
es 
Germany Japan EC 
    
                                                 
101 1: Favorable decision for Appellant + AB Member has same nationality with Appellant 
2: Favorable decision for Appellee + AB Member has same nationality with Appellee 
3: Favorable decision for Appellant + AB Member has different nationality with Appellant 
(non-party Member) 
4: Favorable decision for Appellee + AB Member has different nationality with Appellee 
(non-party Member) 
87 
56 
Argentin
a 
US Egypt Philippines Japan 
Argent
ina    
o 
62, 67, 
68 
EC US 
New 
Zealand 
Germany Uruguay US 
  
o 
 
69 
Brazil, 
EC 
Brazil, 
EC 
United 
States 
Egypt 
Philippin
es 
EC 
   
o 
58 US 
India, 
Malaysia, 
Pakistan, 
Thailand 
Philippin
es 
United 
States 
Uruguay US 
   
o 
18 
Australia, 
Canada 
Australia, 
Canada 
Germany 
New 
Zealand 
Egypt 
Austral
ia    
o 
60 
Guatemal
a 
Mexico Uruguay 
New 
Zealand 
Egypt 
Guate
mala    
o 
75, 84 Korea EC, US Japan Germany 
Philippin
es 
Korea 
 
o 
  
76 
Japan, 
US 
Japan, 
US 
New 
Zealand 
Uruguay Japan Japan 
    
46 
Brazil, 
Canada 
Brazil, 
Canada 
Egypt 
United 
States 
Germany Brazil 
   
o 
70 
Canada, 
Brazil 
Canada, 
Brazil 
United 
States 
Philippines Japan 
Canad
a    
o 
90 India US Germany Egypt Japan India 
   
o 
103, 113 Canada 
New 
Zealand, 
US 
Japan Philippines Uruguay 
Canad
a    
o 
34 Turkey India 
New 
Zealand 
United 
States 
Egypt Turkey 
   
o 
87, 110 Chile EC 
Philippin
es 
Germany Uruguay Chile 
 
o 
  
121 
Argentin
a, EC 
Argentin
a, EC 
United 
States 
New 
Zealand 
Japan 
Argent
ina    
o 
98 
Korea, 
EC 
Korea, 
EC 
Egypt Germany 
Philippin
es 
Korea o 
   
108 US EC Uruguay 
United 
States 
Philippin
es 
US 
   
o 
138 US EC Japan Egypt Uruguay US 
   
o 
88 
139, 142 
Canada, 
Japan, 
EC 
Canada, 
Japan, 
EC 
Germany 
United 
States 
Philippin
es 
Canad
a 
o o 
  
46 Brazil Canada Egypt 
United 
States 
Germany Brazil 
   
o 
70 Brazil Canada 
Philippin
es 
United 
States 
Germany Brazil 
   
o 
136, 162 
EC, US, 
Japan 
EC, US, 
Japan 
Uruguay Germany 
Philippin
es 
US o o 
  
170 Canada US Uruguay 
United 
States 
India 
Canad
a  
o 
  
161, 169 Korea 
Australia, 
US 
Germany Egypt 
Philippin
es 
Korea 
   
o 
165 EC, US EC, US 
United 
States 
Uruguay Japan US 
    
166 US, EC US, EC Uruguay Egypt Japan US 
   
o 
141 EC India 
United 
States 
Egypt 
Philippin
es 
EC 
   
o 
135 
Canada, 
EC 
Canada, 
EC 
Philippin
es 
United 
States 
Germany 
Canad
a 
o o 
  
122 Thailand Poland India Uruguay Japan 
Thaila
nd    
o 
177, 178 
US, 
Australia, 
New 
Zealand 
US, 
Austalia, 
New 
Zealand 
Germany 
United 
States 
India US 
    
184 
US, 
Japan 
US, 
Japan 
Japan Philippines Uruguay US o o 
  
192 US Pakistan Egypt Germany India US 
   
o 
58 Malaysia US 
United 
States 
India Uruguay 
Malays
ia  
o 
  
132 Mexico US 
Philippin
es 
Egypt Germany 
Mexic
o    
o 
108 US, EC US, EC 
Philippin
es 
India Japan US 
   
o 
176 EC, US EC, US Germany 
United 
States 
Uruguay US o o 
  
89 
103, 113 Canada 
New 
Zealand, 
US 
Japan Egypt India 
New 
Zealan
d, US 
  
o 
 
202 
US, 
Korea 
US, 
Korea 
Uruguay 
United 
States 
Egypt US 
    
207 Chile 
Argentin
a 
India 
United 
States 
Australia Chile 
   
o 
231 EC Peru Egypt Egypt Brazil EC 
   
o 
213 US, EC US, EC Japan India Italy US o o 
  
212 US EC Australia Egypt 
United 
States 
US 
   
o 
103, 113 Canada 
New 
Zealand, 
US 
Brazil Italy Japan 
Canad
a    
o 
217, 234 US 
Australia, 
Brazil, 
Canada, 
Chile, 
EC, 
India, 
Indonesia
, Japan, 
Korea, 
Mexico, 
Thailand 
Italy Brazil Australia US 
 
o 
  
141 India EC Egypt 
United 
States 
Japan EC 
  
o 
 
219 Brazil EC India Brazil Italy EC o 
   
248, 249, 
251, 252, 
253, 254, 
258, 259 
US, 
China, 
EC, 
Japan, 
Korea, 
New 
Zealand, 
Norway, 
Switzerla
nd 
US, EC, 
Japan 
Korea, 
New 
Zealand, 
Norway, 
Switzerla
nd 
United 
States 
Egypt Australia US 
  
o o 
245 
Japan, 
US 
Japan, 
US 
Australia Brazil Italy Japan 
   
o 
244 Japan US Japan Egypt India Japan 
   
o 
257 
US, 
Canada 
US, 
Canada 
Brazil Australia Italy US 
   
o 
90 
246 EC India Egypt Brazil Italy EC 
   
o 
264 
US, 
Canada 
US, 
Canada 
India Brazil 
United 
States 
US 
    
276 
US, 
Canada 
US, 
Canada 
Australia Egypt Japan 
Canad
a    
o 
268 
US, 
Argentin
a 
Argentin
a, US 
Japan Egypt India US 
   
o 
267 
US, 
Brazil 
Brazil, 
US 
United 
States 
Brazil India US o o 
  
285 
US, 
Antigua 
and 
Barbuda 
US, 
Antigua 
and 
Barbuda 
Italy Egypt Australia US 
   
o 
302 
Dominica
n 
Republic, 
Honduras 
Honduras
, 
Dominica
n 
Republic 
Brazil Australia Italy 
Domin
ican 
Republ
ic 
   
o 
265, 266, 
283 
EC, 
Australia, 
Brazil, 
Thailand 
Australia, 
Brazil, 
Thailand, 
EC 
India 
United 
States 
Japan EC 
   
o 
296 
US, 
Korea 
Korea, 
US 
Egypt 
United 
States 
Japan US 
    
269, 286 
EC, 
Brazil, 
Thailand 
Brazil, 
Thailand, 
EC 
Italy Brazil India EC o o 
  
282 
Mexico, 
US 
US, 
Mexico 
India Australia Japan US 
   
o 
295 Mexico US Australia Egypt Japan 
Mexic
o    
o 
257 US Canada 
United 
States 
Brazil Italy US 
   
o 
108 US, EC EC, US Egypt India 
United 
States 
US 
    
308 Mexico US Japan 
United 
States 
Italy 
Mexic
o  
o 
  
277 Canada US Brazil Egypt India 
Canad
a    
o 
294 EC, US US, EC Italy 
United 
States 
Japan US o o 
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264 Canada US Egypt Brazil Italy US 
  
o 
 
315 US, EC EC, US India 
United 
States 
Japan EC 
    
322 
Japan, 
US 
US, 
Japan 
Italy Egypt India US 
   
o 
268 
US, 
Argentin
a 
Argentin
a, US 
Japan 
United 
States 
South 
Africa 
US 
    
207 
Chile, 
Argentin
a 
Argentin
a, Chile 
Brazil Egypt Italy Chile 
   
o 
336 
Japan, 
Korea 
Korea, 
Japan 
South 
Africa 
India Italy Japan 
   
o 
332 EC Brazil Egypt Brazil Japan Brazil 
  
o 
 
344 Mexico US India Philippines Italy US 
  
o 
 
267 
US, 
Brazil 
Brazil, 
US 
Brazil 
United 
States 
South 
Africa 
US o o 
  
345, 343 
India, 
Thailand, 
US 
US, 
India, 
Thailand 
Italy Brazil India US o o 
  
320, 321 
EC, 
Canada, 
US 
Canada, 
EC, US 
South 
Africa 
Egypt 
Philippin
es 
US, 
Canad
a 
   
o 
360 US, India India, US 
United 
States 
Italy China US 
    
27 EC 
Ecuador, 
US 
Brazil Japan 
South 
Africa 
EC 
   
o 
339, 340, 
342 
China 
Canada; 
EC; US 
Philippin
es 
United 
States 
Italy China 
 
o 
  
350 EC; US US; EC China Brazil 
South 
Africa 
US 
   
o 
294 EC, US US; EC Japan Philippines 
United 
States 
US 
    
322 US Japan Italy Philippines China US 
   
o 
363 
China, 
US 
US, 
China 
United 
States 
Japan Mexico China o o 
  
92 
367 
Australia; 
New 
Zealand 
New 
Zealand; 
Australia 
China 
United 
States 
Japan 
Austral
ia    
o 
316 EU; US US; EU 
South 
Africa 
Philippines Belgium EU 
    
379 China US Mexico Philippines Belgium US 
  
o 
 
371 Thailand 
Philippin
es 
Belgium Mexico China 
Thaila
nd    
o 
397 
EU, 
China 
China, 
EU 
Japan 
United 
States 
South 
Africa 
EU 
   
o 
353 EU, US US, EU 
Philippin
es 
South 
Africa 
China US 
   
o 
399 China US 
United 
States 
Japan Belgium China 
    
394, 395, 
398 
China, 
US, EU, 
Mexico 
US, EU, 
Mexico, 
China 
Mexico 
United 
States 
Japan China o o 
  
396, 403 
Philippin
es, EU 
EU, US, 
Philippin
es 
Belgium 
United 
States 
Mexico 
Philipp
ines 
o o 
  
406 US Indonesia Japan Mexico Belgium US 
   
o 
381 
US, 
Mexico 
Mexico, 
US 
China India 
United 
States 
US 
    
384, 386 
US, 
Canada, 
Mexico 
Canada, 
Mexico, 
US 
India Mexico Belgium US o o 
  
414 China US 
South 
Africa 
Belgium China China 
   
o 
412, 426 Canada 
Japan, 
EU, 
Canada 
Mexico India 
South 
Africa 
Canad
a    
o 
400, 401 
Canada, 
Norway, 
EU 
EU, 
Canada, 
Norway 
United 
States 
Korea China EU 
  
o o 
449 
China, 
US 
US, 
China 
India Korea China US o o 
  
431, 432, 
433 
US, 
China, 
EU 
China, 
US, EU, 
Japan 
Korea Mexico China China 
    
436 India 
United 
States, 
India 
Mexico India 
United 
States 
US o o 
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437 
China, 
US 
China Belgium India Korea US 
  
o o 
438, 444, 
445 
Argentin
a, EU, 
Japan 
EU, US, 
Japan, 
Argentin
a 
Korea India Mexico 
Argent
ina    
o 
429 Viet Nam 
United 
States 
United 
States 
India Belgium 
Viet 
Nam  
o 
  
384, 386 
US, 
Canada, 
Mexico 
Canada, 
Mexico, 
US 
Mexico Korea Belgium US o o 
  
430 India US China Korea Mauritius India 
   
o 
457 
Peru, 
Guatemal
a 
Peru India 
United 
States 
China Peru o 
 
o 
 
454, 460 
Japan (in 
DS454); 
China (in 
DS 460), 
EU 
China (in 
DS454 
and 
DS460) 
Belgium 
United 
States 
Mexico China o o 
  
381 
US, 
Mexico 
Mexico, 
US 
Mauritius India China US 
  
o o 
397 
EU, 
Other 
Appellant
: China 
China, 
EU 
Mexico 
United 
States 
Mauritius EU 
   
o 
453 
Panama, 
Other 
Appellant
: 
Argentin
a 
Argentin
a, 
Panama 
Korea India China 
Argent
ina    
o 
461 Colombia Panama China Mauritius Belgium 
Colom
bia     
464 US Korea 
United 
States 
India Mexico US 
 
o 
  
456 India US Belgium Korea 
United 
States 
India 
 
o 
  
473 
EU, 
Argentin
a 
Argentin
a, EU 
India Belgium China EU 
    
475 
Russian 
Federatio
n, EU 
EU, 
Russian 
Federatio
n 
Mauritius Mexico Belgium Russia o o 
  
471 China US India Mexico Mauritius US 
  
o 
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SUM 25 33 15 64 
 
Annex 2. Trade Remedy Cases102 
Dispute  
Number 
Agreements addressed Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 
DS 22 SCM El-Naggar Ehlermann Lacarte-Muró 
DS 60 Anti-dumping Lacarte-Muró Beeby El-Naggar 
DS 46 SCM El-Naggar Bacchus Ehlermann 
DS 70 SCM Bacchus Feliciano Matsushita 
DS 121 Safeguards Bacchus Beeby Matsushita 
DS 98 Safeguards El-Naggar Ehlermann Feliciano 
DS 108 SCM Lacarte-Muró Bacchus Feliciano 
DS 138 Anti-dumping & SCM Matsushita El-Naggar Lacarte-Muró 
DS 139, 142 SCM Ehlermann Bacchus Feliciano 
DS 46 SCM El-Naggar Bacchus Ehlermann 
DS 70 SCM Feliciano Bacchus Ehlermann 
DS 136, 162 Anti-dumping Lacarte-Muró Ehlermann Feliciano 
DS 166 Safeguards Lacarte-Muró Abi-Saab Taniguchi 
DS 141 Anti-dumping Bacchus Abi-Saab Feliciano 
DS 122 Anti-dumping Ganesan Lacarte-Muró Taniguchi 
DS 177, 178 Safeguards Ehlermann Bacchus Ganesan 
DS 184 Anti-dumping Taniguchi Feliciano Lacarte-Muró 
DS 132 Anti-dumping Feliciano Abi-Saab Ehlermann 
DS 108 SCM Feliciano Ganesan Taniguchi 
DS 103, 113 SCM Taniguchi Abi-Saab Ganesan 
DS 202 Safeguards Lacarte-Muró Bacchus Abi-Saab 
DS 213 SCM Taniguchi Ganesan Sacerdoti 
DS 212 SCM Lockhart Abi-Saab Bacchus 
DS 217, 234 Anti-dumping & SCM Sacerdoti Baptista Lockhart 
DS 141 Anti-dumping Abi-Saab Bacchus Taniguchi 
                                                 
102 Cases that were served by trade-remedy experts are colored in grey and experts’ names 
are highlighted with boldface. 
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DS 219 Anti-dumping Ganesan Baptista Sacerdoti 
DS 248, 249, 
251, 252, 253, 
254, 258, 259 
Safeguards Bacchus Abi-Saab Lockhart 
DS 244 Anti-dumping Taniguchi Abi-Saab Ganesan 
DS 257 SCM Baptista Lockhart Sacerdoti 
DS 264 Anti-dumping Ganesan Baptista Janow 
DS 268 Anti-dumping Taniguchi Abi-Saab Ganesan 
DS 267 SCM Janow Baptista Ganesan 
DS 265, 266, 
283 
SCM Ganesan Janow Taniguchi 
DS 296 SCM Abi-Saab Janow Taniguchi 
DS 282 Anti-dumping Ganesan Lockhart Taniguchi 
DS 295 Anti-dumping & SCM Lockhart Abi-Saab Taniguchi 
DS 108 SCM Abi-Saab Ganesan Janow 
DS 277 Anti-dumping & SCM Baptista Abi-Saab Ganesan 
DS 294 Anti-dumping Sacerdoti Janow Taniguchi 
DS 264 Anti-dumping Abi-Saab Baptista Sacerdoti 
DS 322 Anti-dumping Sacerdoti Abi-Saab Ganesan 
DS 268 Anti-dumping Taniguchi Janow Unterhalter 
DS 336 SCM Unterhalter Ganesan Sacerdoti 
DS 344 Anti-dumping Ganesan Bautista Sacerdoti 
DS 267 SCM Baptista Hillman Unterhalter 
DS 345, 343 Anti-dumpng Sacerdoti Baptista Ganesan 
DS 350 Anti-dumping Zhang Baptista Unterhalter 
DS 294 Anti-dumping Oshima Bautista Hillman 
DS 322 Anti-dumping Sacerdoti Bautista Zhang 
DS 316 SCM Unterhalter Bautista Van den Bossche 
DS 379 SCM Ramírez-Hernández Bautista Van den Bossche 
DS 371 Anti-dumping Van den Bossche 
Ramírez-
Hernández 
Zhang 
DS 397 Anti-dumping Oshima Hillman Unterhalter 
DS 353 SCM Bautista Unterhalter Zhang 
DS 414 Anti-dumping & SCM Unterhalter Van den Bossche Zhang 
DS 412, 426 SCM Ramírez-Hernández Bhatia Unterhalter 
DS 449 SCM Bhatia Chang Zhang 
DS 436, SCM Ramírez-Hernández Bhatia Graham 
96 
DS 437 SCM Van den Bossche Bhatia Chang 
DS 429 Anti-dumping Graham Bhatia Van den Bossche 
DS 454, 460 Anti-dumping Van den Bossche Graham 
Ramírez-
Hernández 
DS 397 Anti-dumping Ramírez-Hernández Graham Servansing 
DS 461 Anti-dumping & SCM Zhang Servansing Van den Bossche 
DS 473 Anti-dumping Bhatia Van den Bossche Zhang 
DS 471 Anti-dumping Bhatia 
Ramírez-
Hernández 
Servansing 
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국문 초록 
WTO 상소기구 운영 평가: 상소 위원 구성을 중점으로 
 
이하경 
   
  1995년 출범 이후 세계무역기구(WTO)의 상소기구는 500여 건이 넘
는 무역 분쟁을 다룸으로써 그 중요성을 증명해왔다. 상소기구가 세계 
무역에서 가지고 있는 의의가 심화됨에 따라 그 운영을 평가하는 선행 
연구들이 존재했다. 하지만 본 연구는 그 운영방식이 WTO 상소기구 운
영을 관할하고 있는 분쟁해결양해(Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes) 와 상소기구를 위
한 작업절차(Working Procedures for Appellate Review)와 같은 규정
을 준수하고 있는지에 초점을 맞추고 있다. 그 중에서도 상소 기구를 이
루고 있는 주체인 상소기구 위원 구성에 있어 상소기구가 공정성과 전문
성을 가지고 있는지에 대해 평가하고자 한다. 
본 연구는 세 가지 기준에 따라 상소기구 위원 구성의 공정성과 전문
성을 평가했다. 공정성을 판단하기 위해 첫째로 상소기구 구성이 WTO 
98 
회원국을 대변할 수 있는 대표성을 띠고 있는지 확인해보았다. 둘째로 
국적국가 출신의 상소기구 위원이 분쟁해결 과정에 참여할 수 있다는 점
을 고려하여 이러한 사실이 국적국가에 유리하게 작용하는지 알아보았다. 
마지막으로 전문성을 평가하기 위해 전체 분쟁의 50%를 구성하는 무역 
구제 분쟁에 대하여 상소기구 위원들이 얼마나 전문성을 가지고 있는지 
검토했다. 
그 결과 상소기구 위원 구성에 있어 문제점이 발견되었다. 역대 상소
기구 위원들은 WTO 회원국 전체를 대변할 수 있다고 생각될 만큼 다
양한 국가에서 선발되지 않았다. 또한 27명의 역대 상소기구 위원 중 3
명의 위원만이 무역 구제 분쟁에 전문성을 갖추고 있었다. 하지만 국적
국가 출신의 위원이 있다고 해도 그 판결에 있어서 국적국가의 유리함은 
발견되지 않았다. 
 
주제어: 세계무역기구 상소 기구, 상소기구 위원 구성, 분쟁해결양해, 전
문성 
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